Access Flow governs. Your Physical Security Access Control System enforces.
Version 0.3 · updated 22 Nov 2026
Spec for a self-service and governance layer over existing access control systems (Physical Security Access Control Systems) for multi-site enterprises. v0.3 records the decisions since v0.2: customer-configurable security levels, guest invite or link per guest, 30-minute magic links, NOX/SIMS as the first integration via its SQL integration table at no extra licence cost, PIN reveal with safeguards, mandatory sponsor and dates, card activation by manager or sponsor, no approval timeouts, duration and renewal defaults, an area owner overview with revocation, end dates written to the Physical Security Access Control System and reconciliation in the prototype, revocation alerts and emergency revoke, theme-proof map meaning, and passkey (WebAuthn/FIDO2) sign-in as an optional alternative and fallback to SSO, as the sole sign-in method at fully offline sites, and with guest enrolment via magic link (22 Nov 2026, decided by Kim).
1. Scope, delivery and requirements
First customers
Multi-site enterprises (SMB is a later goal)
Hardware
Integrate existing Physical Security Access Control Systems and controllers; no own hardware
Problem addressed
Weak self-service and weak integration in current systems
Immediate delivery
Front-end UX prototype; security staff fulfil requests manually, including end dates, and reconcile against Physical Security Access Control System report data (no live Physical Security Access Control System integration)
First integration
NOX/SIMS, after the prototype
Deployment models
SaaS cloud managed by us (focus), customer-hosted hybrid in the customer's cloud, isolated in the customer's datacenter; none built yet
Prototype status
In progress, not completed (cloud build running as of 8 Nov 2026)
Product requirements
The product requirements list now lives on its own page. It was moved there once and the pages are not synced.
All three models should be possible, and the focus is on the first. These are planned product deployment options; none has been built or provisioned, and the prototype stays a front-end with manual fulfillment.
SaaS tenancy: customers share one SaaS application, and each customer has its own separate database. This does not mean separate application instances per customer, and the database engine, servers, keys, backups and credentials are not specified here. Tenant isolation still applies throughout, including sites, areas and roles.
SaaS connector: a connector runs inside the customer's network. It only opens outbound encrypted connections to the SaaS service, so the SaaS service needs no inbound connection into the customer's network, and it reaches the SIMS database integration table locally, so that database is not exposed publicly. Protocol and connection details are not specified here.
Isolated deployment: runs without internet or SaaS connectivity. Core operation never depends on online SaaS callbacks, telemetry, online activation or online updates; updates are delivered offline and applied under the customer's control. Any dependency in that model, such as identity and SSO, must also work within this offline requirement; how is still to be designed.
Not yet decided: the cloud provider, and commercial terms and operational responsibilities for the customer-hosted models.
Anything in this spec that isn't on the Product requirements page is a proposal.
2. Identity, SSO, roles and scoping
Concern
Decision
Authentication
Passkeys (WebAuthn/FIDO2) as an optional alternative and fallback to enterprise SSO via SAML 2.0 or OpenID Connect; a user can sign in with either, except at a fully offline site, where passkeys are the only sign-in method
Identity authority
Entra ID or Workday, configured per tenant; source of people and employment dates
Local identities
External Employees and temporary visitors may exist only in the platform; sponsor, start and end required
Guests (Entra ID tenants)
Sign in via Entra ID guest accounts; for each guest, either invite a new guest account or link an existing one
Guests (other tenants)
Sign in via an email magic link to their local record; link and session last 30 minutes
Authentication answers who is signed in; the identity authority answers who is employed and until when. A tenant can use one system for both or different ones; choosing Workday as the identity source does not decide which SSO is used. A local external employee or visitor does not need to exist in the HR or identity source first.
Magic links and the sessions they start last 30 minutes. Proposed: links are single-use and valid only for the guest's own local record. In the prototype the flow is simulated, with no real emails or credentials.
Passkey sign-in
Decided (22 Nov 2026, Kim): passkeys (WebAuthn/FIDO2) are an optional alternative and fallback to the tenant's SSO/IdP. A user can sign in with either method. Passkeys do not replace SSO and are not the preferred or primary sign-in method. Enterprise SSO via SAML 2.0 or OpenID Connect stays available for enterprise tenants, and guest magic links stay as specified above.
Decided (22 Nov 2026, Kim): at a fully offline site (no internet, so the tenant's SSO/IdP is unreachable), passkeys are the only sign-in method, because they can be verified locally. Passkeys authenticate only to the Access Flow portal, not to doors; the Physical Security Access Control System keeps enforcing door access locally.
Decided (22 Nov 2026, Kim): guests enrol a passkey via a magic link (an emailed one-time link). The lifetime of that enrolment link is not yet decided.
Proposed: a user enrolls a passkey after their first sign-in via SSO. A user can register more than one passkey. Both synced passkeys (for example those held in a platform authenticator such as iCloud Keychain or Google Password Manager) and device-bound passkeys are supported.
Decided (22 Nov 2026, Kim): passkeys are a fallback and are not required. They are optional for users. Tenants cannot require passkeys, and SSO is not disabled in favour of passkeys, except at a fully offline site, where passkeys are the only working sign-in method as already recorded.
Decided (22 Nov 2026, Kim): recovery fallback is admin intervention. A tenant admin restores access or allows re-enrolment when a user loses their passkey. Those admin recovery actions are written to the audit trail (who, for whom, when).
Not yet decided: whether the prototype simulates passkeys or only documents them for a later phase. Proposed: production passkey support is part of phase 2; the prototype may simulate enrolment and sign-in, with no real authenticator required.
A valid signed-in session, started with SSO or a passkey, is what later sections mean when they require a valid SSO session, unless a later rule names a specific method.
Sponsor, start date and end date are mandatory for every external employee and visitor; a record missing any of them is rejected. Managers can onboard external employees.
Duration and renewal defaults
Setting
Default
Maximum sponsorship
1 year
Visitor duration
7 days
Renewal default: employees
5 years
Renewal default: external employees
1 year
Renewal default: guests
30 days
Every value is configurable per customer; these are the defaults. The 7-day visitor duration limits a visitor's initial validity, and the 30-day guest renewal default is a separate setting; one does not change the other.
Renewals are never granted automatically and never bypass approval; existing approval rules apply. A renewal can't carry access past the person's eligibility end; that needs a separate, authorised change to employment or sponsorship dates.
Each renewal default is both the review interval and the length of each extension. Reaching the review interval starts the renewal workflow; it does not grant or extend access by itself, and the extension still follows normal approval and stays within eligibility.
Roles
Role
Scope
Can do
Cannot do by default
Employee
Self
View map, request access, upload photo, activate own card, set PIN
Approve anything
Manager
Team
Request for team, set team members' escalation and delegation paths (later phase), onboard external employees, activate cards of external employees they manage, approve where the level assigns managers
Approve where the level assigns only area owners
External Employee / visitor / guest
Self, within sponsorship
Request access, upload photo, set PIN, time-limited
Activate own card or extend own sponsorship
Sponsor
Sponsored people
Set and end sponsorship dates, request access and activate cards for them
Activate cards of people they don't sponsor; exceed policy maximum duration
Tenant admin
One tenant
Manage people, sites, theme, security levels and settings; set users' escalation and delegation paths (later phase); receive alerts for unconfirmed revocations
Approve area access just by being admin
Area owner
Areas they own
Approve requests, view the overview of their areas, revoke access in their areas, run access reviews
Revoke in areas they don't own; disable a person tenant-wide; administer people or settings
Security staff
Tenant or sites
Confirm or fail manual fulfillment, including end dates and revocations; emergency revoke; reveal a PIN for their task; work on reconciliation findings; receive alerts for unconfirmed revocations
Approve requests just by being security staff; reveal PINs outside their assigned task
Proposed rules: approval rights are separate from administration, each role assignment is a role plus a scope, and nobody can approve their own request. Security staff do the manual fulfillment in the prototype, and the role stays in production after NOX/SIMS integration for exceptions and oversight. Proposed: routine fulfillment is automated where the connector supports it, while security staff handle exceptions, emergency and other manual work, and oversee reconciliation; this does not mean every production change needs manual approval.
Relationships: Tenant → Site / floor → Area → Door / reader. Person → Eligibility and Person → Credential. Eligibility → Entitlement (bounds). Area → Entitlement. Entitlement → Fulfillment record.
Person
Source is the identity authority (Entra ID or Workday) or local (external employee, visitor, with mandatory sponsor and dates). Guests are linked to an invited or existing Entra ID guest account where the tenant uses Entra ID, or sign in by email magic link otherwise.
Eligibility
Start and end date-time with time zone. The outer limit for every entitlement.
Credential
Card (assigned, activation pending, active, deactivated, revoked), PIN (secret, masked by default), photo. Card state is independent of entitlements: changing it never creates, broadens or removes area access.
Security level
Defined per tenant: name, and approver set to manager, area owner, or both.
Area
A zone drawn on the site/floor map, made up of doors, with one security level and one or more owners; later mapped to access levels in each Physical Security Access Control System.
Entitlement
A person's approved access to an area, with an end no later than their eligibility end. Keeps every approval step (approver and time) and, if revoked, the confirmed revocation record: actor, time and reason. The original grant and approvals are never overwritten. Entitlements are independent of card state and stay in place when a card is deactivated.
Fulfillment record
Desired vs confirmed state, including the person, card, areas and start/end dates entered in the Physical Security Access Control System, plus who confirmed it and when (manual in the prototype, adapter later). Used for grants, revocations and emergency revocations.
Reconciliation report
A monthly comparison of Physical Security Access Control System records against the platform, with data captured-at and compared-at times, coverage (sites, areas, record types) and findings; each finding links to a remediation task. In the prototype it uses imported or mock Physical Security Access Control System report data (see section 5).
Rule: an entitlement's effective end is the earlier of its own end date and the person's eligibility end. Shortening eligibility shortens every entitlement.
4. Access map, requests and approval
Map state
Meaning
Shown as
Has access
Fulfillment confirmed, and now within the validity window and eligibility
Green plus label and icon
No access
No entitlement
Red plus label and icon
Pending
Requested, or approved but fulfillment not yet confirmed
Distinct style plus label
Unknown
State cannot be determined
Distinct neutral style plus label
Every signed-in user sees the full map of their own tenant, whatever access they have. Clicking an area opens a request for it. Seeing an area never grants access or skips approval. State is never shown by color alone.
The labels and icons for has access, no access, pending and unknown stay the same under every tenant theme; a theme can change colors but not this meaning.
Green only when fulfillment is confirmed, so approved but unfulfilled access shows as pending, even when every approval step is complete. Approval and fulfillment are separate states.
Green also requires the current time to be within the access start and end and the person's eligibility; access that has expired or not yet started is never green. In the prototype, confirmed means attested by security staff, not verified by the Physical Security Access Control System.
The map shows access assignment, not card status. Where a person has confirmed access but their card is not active, the area stays green with a separate inactive-card note, so the map never implies the card currently opens the door. Proposed wording for the note: "assigned access; card inactive".
Request
Click an area on the map; set dates and justification (self, team member or sponsored person).
Policy check
Eligibility, end date within the outer limit, required credentials present.
Route
To the manager, the area owner or both, as the tenant's security level for that area defines.
Approve or reject
Decision and reason recorded. Requests never time out or expire while waiting.
Fulfil
Prototype: security staff enter it in the Physical Security Access Control System with its start and end dates and confirm. Later: adapter.
Confirm
Map and requester update only after confirmation.
Security level matrix
Each customer (tenant) configures its own matrix: how many levels, their names, and whether each level is approved by the manager, the area owner, or both. Production values are set per customer, not fixed for all.
Level
Prototype approval chain
Low
Manager
Medium
Area owner
High
Manager, then area owner
Restricted
Manager, then area owner, with a shorter maximum duration
Status: this suggested matrix is accepted for the prototype only. The v0.1 auto-approval option for Low is not part of it.
Timeouts, escalation and delegation
No approval timeouts
A pending request is never approved, rejected or expired automatically because nobody acted on it. This is separate from eligibility and access end dates, which still apply.
Escalation (production)
A requester can escalate a pending request immediately, without waiting. Escalation draws attention to the request; it never approves it or skips a required approver.
Delegation (production)
Approvers can delegate their approval authority. A delegate approves only within the delegating approver's scope.
Paths per user (later phase)
Escalation and delegation paths can be set on a user level. By default, both go to the employee's manager. The default only decides who receives an escalation or delegation; it never approves a request on its own, removes an area owner step the security level requires, or lets anyone approve their own request.
Delegation duration and path setting (later phase)
A delegation can last until the delegating employee's termination. A user's escalation and delegation paths can be set or changed by the user, the user's manager, or an administrator. There are no limits on who can be chosen as a delegate. Tenant isolation, the delegating approver's scope, required approval steps and the no-self-approval rule still apply to every request.
Prototype scope
Neither escalation nor delegation is part of the prototype; both are later-phase requirements.
Area owner overview and revocation
Area owners get an overview of all the areas they own, showing who has access, who approved it and when, and they can revoke access. Planned for the prototype scope; not built yet.
Overview shows
Detail
Areas
Every area the owner owns, across sites
Person
Name and type: employee, external employee, visitor or guest
State
Active (confirmed), pending (approved, not yet confirmed), revocation pending, revoked, expired
Validity
Start and end, capped by eligibility
Approvals
Each approval step with approver and time; both steps where the route has two
Fulfillment
Who confirmed it and when, shown separately from approval times
Revoke
The area owner revokes a person's access to one of their own areas. No further approval is needed.
Record
The actor, time and reason are recorded.
Revocation pending
Prototype: shown as pending until security staff update the Physical Security Access Control System and confirm; while unconfirmed it alerts security staff and tenant admins.
Confirmed or failed
A confirmed revocation ends the access; a failed one stays visible to the owner and security staff.
Scope: an area owner can revoke only in areas they own, never in other areas and never by disabling a person tenant-wide. In production the server enforces this. After a revocation, the original grant, its approvers and approval times stay in the history and audit trail.
Proposed UX: filters by area, by person and by state.
5. Lifecycle, fulfillment and provisioning state
State
Meaning
Desired
Platform has decided the change
Pending
Awaiting security staff (prototype) or adapter acknowledgment
Confirmed
Recorded as applied, with who and when (prototype: security staff attestation, not Physical Security Access Control System verification); the only state that can show green on the map
Failed
Could not be applied; needs follow-up
Drift
A reconciliation found a difference between the Physical Security Access Control System and the platform
Manual fulfillment (prototype)
Who
Security staff signed in with valid SSO.
What they enter
The correct person, card, areas and start and end dates in the Physical Security Access Control System, so time-limited access expires there on schedule.
Record
Each confirmation records the staff member's identity and an automatic timestamp. In production the server's clock is authoritative.
Meaning
A person's statement that the change was applied; reconciliation checks it against the Physical Security Access Control System.
Scope
Grants, card activations, revocations and emergency revocations, including those started by area owners.
PIN
Masked by default; authorised security staff can press Show PIN code to read it while entering it into the access system, and it re-masks automatically (see section 6).
Card activation
Employees activate only their own assigned card, and the only check is a valid SSO session. Guests, visitors and external employees cannot activate their own card. Their manager or sponsor activates it for them, with a valid SSO session, and only for people they manage or sponsor, not for anyone else in the tenant. Where an external employee has both a manager and a sponsor, either one may activate the card alone; it is not a dual approval. No extra identity check or approval is needed.
Card activation and area access are separate processes. Activation does not create or broaden entitlements; it enables the card for the access already assigned, approved and confirmed for that person, so no extra area approval is needed. Entitlements still end at their own end date or eligibility end, whichever is earlier.
A person can have assigned, approved access while their card is deactivated; deactivating a card doesn't revoke or delete any entitlement. Activation stays pending until security staff confirm it, separately from fulfillment of the person's area access.
Scheduled expiry and monthly reconciliation
Most Physical Security Access Control Systems support time-limited access, so access entered with its end date expires in the Physical Security Access Control System on schedule. When security staff enter changes correctly, the Physical Security Access Control System stays in sync, and a monthly report from the Physical Security Access Control System confirms it.
For the prototype: end dates are written into the Physical Security Access Control System by security staff as part of manual fulfillment, and the prototype includes reconciliation of actual Physical Security Access Control System state against desired state, using imported or mock Physical Security Access Control System report data. Automated connector writes come later.
Operating note: scheduled expiry is enforced by the Physical Security Access Control System where the access is time-limited there. An early or manual revocation, such as by an area owner, takes effect once the Physical Security Access Control System is updated. A reconciliation shows alignment at the time its data was taken, within what it covers.
Report finding
Example
Missing in Physical Security Access Control System
Confirmed in the platform, not found in the Physical Security Access Control System
Extra in Physical Security Access Control System
Found in the Physical Security Access Control System, with no matching approved access in the platform
Mismatch
Person, card, area or dates differ between the two
Expired still present
Past its end date in the platform but still active in the Physical Security Access Control System
An expired record kept in the Physical Security Access Control System as inactive or as history is not a finding; "expired still present" means it is still active there after its end date.
Report details
Each report records when the Physical Security Access Control System data was captured and when the comparison was run, and lists exactly which sites, areas and record types it covers. It says 'in sync' only for records it actually compared and found matching; anything outside its coverage is not reported as in sync.
Remediation
Every finding becomes a tracked task for security staff. The audit trail keeps who resolved it, when, and how it was resolved, including the action taken.
Later phase
The NOX/SIMS connector writes start and end dates directly, and reconciliation runs from connector data; NOX/SIMS supports both. Built after the prototype.
Termination
At the termination date and time, revoke access and deactivate credentials, and end any delegation the person granted; each change is tracked until confirmed.
Area owner revocation
Revokes one person's access to one owned area; tracked until confirmed like any other change.
Unconfirmed revocation alerts
Unconfirmed revocations stay visible and alert both security staff and tenant admins until confirmed or resolved.
Emergency revoke
Immediate manual revocation with the same confirmation tracking: pending until security staff update the Physical Security Access Control System and confirm.
6. Audit, PIN and photo privacy
Audit trail
Append-only log of requests, approvals, fulfillment confirmations, card activations, PIN reveals, passkey registration, passkey removal, passkey use, admin passkey recovery, revocations, emergency revocations, and reconciliation findings with how each was resolved: who, what, when, why. Every revocation records actor, time and reason, and never removes the original grant or its approvers. Passkey events record actor and time, never biometric data. Admin passkey recovery (restoring access or allowing re-enrolment) records who, for whom and when.
Access reviews
Area owners periodically recertify access; anything not recertified is removed.
PIN reveal
Masked everywhere by default. During manual fulfillment, authorised security staff can press Show PIN code. Each reveal is logged with actor and time, never the PIN value. PINs are never written to logs or audit exports.
PIN safeguards
The PIN re-masks automatically after 30 seconds. Only least-privilege security staff with valid SSO, scoped to the task, can reveal it. The prototype uses only an obviously fictitious demo PIN, and no real PIN is collected on any Page.
Photos
Validated for format and size; who can view them is restricted; retention after offboarding is set per tenant.
Data protection
Data minimisation and retention for EU customers (GDPR); exact obligations to be confirmed with legal counsel. For passkeys, the platform stores only WebAuthn public-key credentials and related metadata (for example credential id, display name and last used). Biometric data never leaves the user's device and is never stored, transmitted or processed by Access Flow.
Retention after offboarding
Photos and other personal data follow GDPR and standard HR practice. Within that, data is kept only for a lawful purpose and only as long as necessary, then deleted or anonymised. HR practice works inside GDPR, never overriding it. Retention and deletion rules are set per data category and per customer, based on that customer's lawful retention policy and obligations, not one fixed period for everything. Audit records follow their own retention rules: they are not kept identifiable indefinitely by default, and records a customer is required to keep are not erased automatically. The concrete periods are configuration and legal details to set per customer.
7. Enterprise theming
Each tenant can customize more than its logo: design tokens, typography, colors, component styling and terminology. The default is a neutral enterprise theme with no real company's branding.
Map meaning survives any theme. The labels and icons for has access, no access, pending and unknown are fixed, and contrast is checked when a tenant's colors are applied.
Proposed: the contrast check follows a recognised accessibility standard, with the exact level still to be chosen.
8. Integration: NOX/SIMS first (after prototype)
The first Physical Security Access Control System integration after the prototype is NOX/SIMS. The prototype itself stays manual with no live integration. Each Physical Security Access Control System gets an adapter behind one internal interface, and the platform offers only what an adapter supports.
NOX/SIMS supports writing start and end dates directly and providing data for reconciliation (record export).
SIMS supports integration by inserting data into a SQL integration table in its database, and this integration has no additional cost beyond the customer's existing SIMS licence. We have not tested this independently. This covers one integration path only; it does not imply arbitrary writes elsewhere in the database, other NOX APIs, or an SDK. The exact table and schema, supported payloads and operations, and credentials and permissions are implementation details to work out when building the connector. Capabilities in the table not marked as supported are still to be confirmed.
Capability
Why it matters
Create/update cardholder
Onboarding, external employees, visitors
Assign/remove access levels
Entitlement fulfillment and revocation
Native start/end dates (supported)
Scheduled expiry in the Physical Security Access Control System
Card activate/suspend
Activation and termination
PIN write
PIN management, replacing manual PIN reveal
Photo write
Photo upload
Data for reconciliation / record export (supported)
Reconciliation and automated confirmation
Change events
Detect changes made directly in the Physical Security Access Control System
NOX/SIMS validation tasks
Task
Status
Integration path and licensing terms: SQL integration table; no cost beyond the existing SIMS licence
Established
Coverage of native start/end dates and record export
Supported
Obtain a test environment
Pending
Map areas and security levels to NOX/SIMS access configuration
Pending
Only the items above are established. Other capabilities in the table (cardholder, access levels, card state, PIN, photo, change events) are not yet established through the integration table, and none of this has been tested by us. Integration table schema, payloads and database permissions remain implementation details.
9. Phased plan and acceptance tests
Phase
Focus
1 (in progress)
Front-end prototype: SSO sign-in, themed tenant with contrast check, access map, request–approve–manual fulfillment for all roles using the suggested matrix, end dates written to the Physical Security Access Control System at fulfillment, reconciliation against imported or mock Physical Security Access Control System report data, unconfirmed revocation alerts, emergency revoke, area owner overview and revocation, card activation, PIN reveal with safeguards using a fictitious demo PIN, external employee/visitor onboarding, audit log
2 (proposed)
Production hardening on the SaaS cloud model managed by us (the deployment focus): per-customer security level configuration, duration and renewal settings, approval escalation and delegation with per-user paths (default: the employee's manager), server-enforced area owner scope, monthly reconciliation on live customer Physical Security Access Control System reports, Entra ID / Workday identity sync, termination automation, guest invite or link, passkey (WebAuthn/FIDO2) sign-in, production PIN and photo handling, access reviews
3 (proposed)
NOX/SIMS adapter via the SIMS SQL integration table, writing start and end dates directly and replacing manual fulfillment; reconciliation from connector data; security staff kept for exceptions and oversight
4 (proposed)
More adapters, more tenants, cross-system reporting, and the customer-hosted hybrid and isolated deployment models
The phases set an order, not a schedule. Phase 1 simulates the backend; it does not connect to any live Physical Security Access Control System. No report, routine or live access has been generated, and none of the later items are built.
Acceptance tests (draft)
A signed-in user sees every area in their own tenant, and none from another tenant
Map shows has access, no access, pending and unknown, each with a label or icon, not just color
Under every tenant theme, the map state labels and icons stay the same
Applying tenant colors runs a contrast check and flags failing combinations
Clicking an area with no access opens a request; viewing it grants nothing
Approved but unconfirmed access shows as pending, not green, even after every approval step is complete
Access turns green only after fulfillment is confirmed, and only while within its validity window and the person's eligibility; expired or future access is never green
Prototype requests route per the suggested matrix: Low to manager, Medium to area owner, High and Restricted to manager then area owner
A tenant can define its own number of levels and set each to manager, area owner or both, without affecting other tenants
A requester cannot approve their own request
A pending request is never approved, rejected or expired automatically, however long it waits
Production: a requester can escalate at once; escalation never approves or skips an approver
Production: a delegate can approve only within the delegating approver's scope
Production: with no per-user path set, escalation and delegation go to the employee's manager; a per-user path overrides this default
Production: escalation or delegation to the default manager never removes a required area owner step or allows self-approval
Production: a user, their manager or an administrator can set or change the user's escalation and delegation paths; any delegate can be chosen
Production: a delegation stays in effect until the delegating employee's termination, and ends then
Prototype: no escalation or delegation controls are offered
An area owner sees all their owned areas and, per area, each person, type, state, validity, every approver with time, and the fulfillment confirmation separately
An area owner sees no roster for areas they don't own
An area owner can revoke a person's access in an owned area without a new approval; the revocation shows as pending until security staff confirm
An area owner cannot revoke in an area they don't own or disable a person tenant-wide
A failed revocation stays visible to the area owner and security staff
After revocation, the original grant, approvers and approval times remain in the history and audit trail
A revocation cannot be submitted without a reason; the audit trail records its actor, time and reason
Prototype: fulfillment cannot be confirmed without the end date written to the Physical Security Access Control System; the confirmation records the person, card, areas and start and end dates
Prototype: reconciliation against imported or mock Physical Security Access Control System report data flags each of the four finding types: missing in Physical Security Access Control System, extra in Physical Security Access Control System, mismatch, and expired still present
An expired record that is inactive or kept only as history in the Physical Security Access Control System is not flagged; one still active after its platform end date is flagged as expired still present
Every report shows the data captured-at time, the compared-at time, and its coverage by site, area and record type
The report says in sync only for records it compared and found matching; records outside coverage are never shown as in sync
Every finding creates a security staff task; closing it requires the action taken, and the audit trail records who, when and how
An unconfirmed revocation stays visible and alerts both security staff and tenant admins until confirmed
Emergency revoke creates an immediate revocation task, tracked as pending until security staff confirm, and is audited
Sign-in works with the tenant's SAML 2.0 or OpenID Connect setup
In an Entra ID tenant, a guest can be either invited or linked to an existing guest account, and lands on their linked local record
In a tenant without Entra ID, a guest signs in by simulated magic link; a used link, or one older than 30 minutes, is refused, and the session ends after 30 minutes
Production: after first sign-in, a user can enroll a passkey (WebAuthn/FIDO2) and later sign in with it; SSO remains available for enterprise tenants unless tenant policy says otherwise
Production: a user can register more than one passkey, including synced and device-bound authenticators, and can remove a passkey they no longer use
Production: a tenant admin can allow or require passkeys for that tenant
A user who has lost every passkey can recover access through the fallback method once that method is decided
Passkey registration, removal and use are written to the audit trail with actor and time; the log never contains biometric data
The platform stores only public-key credentials and metadata; biometric data never leaves the user's device
An external employee or visitor without a sponsor, start date or end date cannot be saved
A new tenant starts with the defaults: sponsorship up to 1 year, visitors 7 days, renewal 5 years for employees, 1 year for external employees, 30 days for guests; a tenant can change each one
A sponsorship longer than the tenant's maximum, or a visitor longer than the visitor duration, is rejected
A renewal never runs automatically, follows the normal approval route, and never extends access past eligibility end
Reaching the review interval starts the renewal workflow without granting anything; an approved renewal extends by the same default length (e.g. 1 year for an external employee), capped by eligibility
A local external employee or visitor can be created without being in Entra ID or Workday
A permission requested beyond the eligibility end is capped or rejected
An employee activates only their own card with SSO; it stays pending until security staff confirm it
Once confirmed, an activated card carries the person's existing confirmed area access, with no extra approval; it adds no new areas and nothing past each entitlement's end date or eligibility end
Deactivating a card leaves the person's approved, confirmed entitlements in place
Map shows green for confirmed access whatever the card state, with an inactive-card note when the card isn't active
A guest, visitor or external employee cannot activate their own card, including after magic-link sign-in
A manager or sponsor with SSO can activate cards only for people they manage or sponsor; where both exist, either succeeds alone; any other card is refused
Only security staff with valid SSO can confirm fulfillment; each confirmation records who and a server timestamp
PIN is masked by default; Show PIN code is available only to security staff with valid SSO assigned to that task, and each reveal is audited with actor and time but no PIN value
A revealed PIN re-masks automatically after 30 seconds
The prototype shows only an obviously fictitious demo PIN, and no Page collects a real PIN
PINs never appear in logs or audit exports
Retention after offboarding can be set per data category (e.g. photos, personal data, audit records) per customer; no single built-in period applies to all
At termination time, all access is marked for revocation and stays visible until confirmed
A tenant theme changes tokens, typography, colors, components and terminology; the default theme is neutral
10. Open decisions
Decided (22 Nov 2026, Kim): passkeys are an optional alternative and fallback to SSO, not required, not the preferred or primary sign-in method, and do not replace SSO. A user can sign in with either the tenant's SSO/IdP or a passkey. Tenants cannot require passkeys, and SSO is not disabled in favour of passkeys, except at a fully offline site, where passkeys are the only working method. Guests enrol a passkey via a magic link (an emailed one-time link). Recovery fallback is admin intervention: a tenant admin restores access or allows re-enrolment when a user loses their passkey, and those actions are audit-logged (who, for whom, when). At a fully offline site (no internet, SSO/IdP unreachable), passkeys are the only sign-in method, because they can be verified locally. Passkeys authenticate only to the Access Flow portal, not to doors; the Physical Security Access Control System keeps enforcing door access locally.
Cloud provider
Commercial terms for customer-hosted deployments
Operational responsibilities and terms for customer-hosted deployments
Lifetime of the guest passkey enrolment magic link
Offline sites require a locally running Access Flow instance or edge component to verify passkeys and sync back; the deployment model, and how passkeys, credentials and audit sync between site and cloud, are TBD
Whether the prototype simulates passkey enrolment and sign-in, or leaves that to a later phase